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Abstract 
The paper focuses on the working of incentives both in parametric and strategic 
situations. It challenges some of the basic assumptions of the traditional model 
of economic agent which is usually assumed as self-interested and 
consequentialist. Psychological researches have stressed the descriptive 
limitations of that model and pointed out the relevance of other behavioral 
principles. Intrinsic motivations, reciprocity and  trust being the most prominent 
among them. The paper analyses two different kinds of incentive mechanisms, 
namely, intra-personal and inter-personal and presents the results of an 
experiment that emphasize the empirical relevance of the latter. Besides 
providing a more descriptively adequate picture of interactive agency, such 
mechanisms have important normative implications that are discussed in the 
closing section. 
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“One simple possibility is that economic models that 
ignore social psychology are incomplete descriptions of incentives 
in organizations. A more troubling possibility is that 
management practices based on economic models may dampen 
(or even destroy) non-economic realities such as intrinsic 
motivations and social relations” 
R. Gibbons, (1998, p. 130) 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the last decade or so, it has come to be widely accepted that 
“incentives are the essence of economics” (Predergast, 1999, p.7). 
There emerged a huge literature that analyses all the relevant 
aspects of how incentives work and how incentives provision 
systems have to be designed to foster efficiency. Nearly the totality 
of such a strand of studies is based on the assumption that agents 
are classical individual utility maximizers. By “classical individual 
utility maximiser”, here I mean an agent who is actuated by the 
desire to achieve the preferred among the outcomes her actions 
could lead to, and, as corollary of that assumption, that material 
rewards play a dominant role in shaping agent’s preference 
orderings. Although such an assumption is the most commonly 
used when modeling economic facts, a growing body of evidence 
has began, in the recent years, to be accumulated that casts doubts 
about its descriptive accuracy, both in parametric and strategic 
situations. Is becoming more and more clear that actual people, 
when confronted with certain classes of decisions problems, 
systematically do not conform to the predictions implied by 
traditional Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory. It is, 
nevertheless, possible to rationalize and explain those anomalies 
when we consider an enlarged version of rationality, where the 
maximization of material utility is no longer the only motive to 
action, and agents are not only interested in the outcomes of their 
choices but also in the processes that lead to those outcomes. 
Here I shall explore ways to complete that picture of human 
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agency focusing my attention, as Gibbons suggests in the opening 
quotation, on the role of intrinsic motivations and social relations. 
Some of the required amendments turn out to be compatible 
with the basic framework of Rational Choice Theory, while others 
require new concepts to be developed. In both cases, the 
introduction in the motivational structure of economic agents, of 
those psychologically grounded elements, enhances the predictive 
power of economic theory allowing us to understand at a deeper 
level the working of incentives in the decision-making process and 
their many important consequences on the normative side of 
institutional design.  
 
The paper is organized as follow: first, the basic tenets of the 
classical agency theory are described (2); secondly, examples are 
presented that show the importance of intra-personal motivational 
mechanisms (3); thirdly, two of the core assumptions of the 
classical theory are critically analyzed (4); fourth, the role of inter-
personal mechanisms is discussed (5), and a theoretical framework 
based on social approval, reciprocity and trust, is provided, that 
accounts for the empirical evidence discussed earlier (6). The 
implications for the institutional design are drawn (7). The 
conclusions close the paper (8).  
2. How incentives are supposed to work… in theory 
Agency theory assumes two kinds of subjects, the principal 
and the agent. It is usually hold that principals have some interest 
that cannot be pursued without the participation of the agent(s). 
Two main facts characterize the principal-agent relationship: 
firstly, their interests are conflicting, and secondly, agent’s actions 
or characteristics are only imperfectly observable by the principal. 
Let me frame for simplicity, such a relation as a relation between 
employer and employee. The employer aims at maximizing profit 
which positively depends on the employee’s effort. The employee 
is effort adverse and the level of effort actually performed cannot 
be directly observed by the principal. A wage, which constitutes a 
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cost for the employer and a source of utility for the employee, has 
to be provided to the employee to persuade her to perform some 
level of effort. In this sense, an incentive provision system (as 
implied by a contract, for instance) is a device designed to align 
employer’s and employee’s conflicting objectives. The wage 
provided by the employer must satisfy some requirements: from 
the employer’s viewpoint, it has to be at least as higher as her 
reservation utility (participation constraint); and, given that, the 
employee will perform an effort which maximizes her net utility, 
the difference between the utility derived from the wage and the 
disutility from work has to be positive (incentive compatibility 
constraint).  
Underlying such a classical theory there are three assumptions 
according to which:  
1) the higher the paid wage, the higher the effort exerted;  
2) decisions are path-independent; 
3) given the asymmetry in the information structure, each time it 
will be possible, the agent will behave opportunistically. 
 
Most of the recent developments in agency theory2 aim at 
finding optimal compensation schemes capable to reduce the risk 
of opportunism while contextually making the contract attractive 
enough, to be accepted by the agent. Some of the contributions, 
for instance, seek to devise instruments to overcome the imperfect 
observability of agent’s effort linking it to different observable 
signals. Others introduce dynamic considerations to extend the 
relationship over time. Such a move enables theorists to account 
for the strategic role of reputation. Others focus on the problems 
emerging from free-riding in teamwork. Although the lively debate 
ongoing in this area, it seems, nevertheless, that the three 
assumptions above mentioned have remained mostly 
unchallenged.  
In what follows I shall discuss some phenomena that are at 
                                                 
2 See Prendergast (1999) and Gibbons (1998) for complete surveys. 
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odds with those assumptions. In particular, in the next section I 
shall describe patterns of behavior that disconfirm the positive 
relationship, asserted by assumption 1), between material 
incentives and performance and that refute the consequentialist 
orientation of the classical agency theory, as described by 
assumption 2). This latter fact will shed light upon the simplistic 
nature of assumption 3).  
3. How incentives seem to work… in practice: Intra-
personal motivations. 
It is usually believed that assumption 1) is a general law of 
human behavior. So general and well grounded that it has gained 
almost the status of an axiom. While, on the one hand, it is true 
that the assumption has received some degree of empirical 
validation, many, in fact, have found a strict correlation, on the 
aggregate, between increase in wage and increase in productivity, 
on the other hand, such a support can be variously interpreted. 
Firstly, it has to be noticed that the correlation between pay and 
productivity, which is the main empirical finding, may have a 
twofold explanation: first, the more you pay a subject, the more 
she will perform, as the assumption maintains, and secondly, the 
more you offer for a job, the higher the probability to attract 
skilled workers with higher productivity. Thus, the observed 
correlation may be explained both by the “incentive matter-
argument” and the “selection-argument”. Below I shall present 
examples that directly address these two arguments. Let me start 
with the latter.  
This argument entails that increasing the monetary reward for 
a given task one is able to attract subjects better suited for that 
task. Consider the following examples.  
In a seminal study on gift-giving, sociologist Richard Titmuss 
(1970), found that, despite its voluntary basis, the blood donation 
system adopted in England was more efficient (in terms of volume, 
quality and temporal availability of blood received), when compared 
with the remunerated system used in the United States, in those 
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years. Paying for giving blood leads to a reduced quality and quantity 
of blood supply. Trying to increase the supply of blood, Americans 
allowed commercial blood banks to pay donors for the blood they 
gave. But contrary to what they would have expected the result 
turned out to be worse along all the dimensions, when compared to 
the donor system.  
In the study carried-out by Barkema (1995) two groups of 
managers subject to two different regimes of monitoring are 
compared. Group A is left with a larger degree of discretion, while 
group B is strictly monitored. The underlying idea is that as the 
monitoring becomes more stringent it will be easier to observe each 
agents’ effort, and reward it accordingly. That strict correlation 
between effort and reward should exert a positive effect on the level 
of effort itself. However, Barkema reports a puzzling result, as in 
fact, the effect of such different regimes is that group B, that more 
strictly monitored, performs less than Group A, which on the 
contrary is not monitored.  
A third example highlights  the same counterproductive effect. 
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) run an experiment using parents who 
have their children in a kindergarten.  They analyzed for 20 weeks 
how subjects reacted to the introduction of a fine for those parents 
who were late at picking their children causing, this way, problems to 
the staff. The fine was intended, by imposing an additional cost, to 
reduce the number of latecomer parents, which, on the contrary, 
surprisingly increased. The increased number remained stable even 
after the fine was removed.  
These examples highlight the problematic nature both of the 
“selection-argument” and “incentive matter-argument”. As we will 
see Titmuss’ explanation emphasizes the role of the differences in 
the kind of reasons that move different agents (i.e. different people 
react in different ways to the same material incentive), the other 
two examples, however, go further focusing on the difference in 
the kind of reasons that move the same agent (i.e. the same agent’s 
performance may be positively or negatively affected by the same 
material incentive).  
That latter phenomenon may be explained by considering the 
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so-called “crowding-out effect” (Frey, 1997; Frey – Oberholzer-
Gee, 1997). In certain cases the subjects’ willingness to perform a 
given action is decreased (instead of increased, as the intuition 
would suggest) by the prospect of a monetary or material reward. 
Titmuss stressed the importance of being aware that while there is 
people that perform certain tasks because of some form of 
prospective material reward (extrinsic motivation), others may 
have intrinsic reasons to perform the same task. That is important 
because introducing monetary reward will tend to select only the 
former subjects, as the blood donation example shows. The 
crowding-out theory affirms that the same person may have both 
extrinsic and intrinsic reasons, and that when one tries to increase, 
through material rewards, subjects’ willingness to perform certain 
classes of actions ruled by intrinsic motivations, the underlying 
motivation is transformed, from intrinsic to extrinsic, and the 
overall result is a decrease in the agent’ willingness to undertake 
those classes of actions.  
4. A critique of the “Selection-argument” and the 
“Incentives Matter-argument” 
The examples described above stress how the two aspects 
underlying assumption 1), I have dubbed “the Selection-argument” 
and the “Incentives Matter-argument”, posses, in given 
circumstances, a limited empirical validity.  
Consider Titmuss’ explanation. His argument is built around 
the different kinds of motivations that underlie the same action 
(blood donation). In the case of the voluntary donor, the motive is 
altruistic and other-regarding, based on intrinsic reasons; while in 
the case of the remunerated donor, the motive is materially self-
interested, based on extrinsic motivations. According to Titmuss, 
this leads to a self-selection of potential donors, intrinsically 
motivated in one case, and subjects more interested in the material, 
extrinsic reward, on the other; people subject to a stronger 
temptation of opportunism, of being, for instance, less truthful 
about the risk of serum hepatitis. What happened is that the 
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intrinsic motivated potential donors were displaced by the 
introduction of a monetary reward in the American commercial 
blood banks. Such a self-selection strongly affected the quality of 
the blood actually given. 
While Titmuss stresses the risk of adverse selection implied by 
the use of material incentives, the other two examples show how the 
introduction of a monetary reward may discourage the same person 
to perform the very action the incentive was intended to encourage. 
The reasons behind such a phenomenon are many3; among them, 
particularly relevant are those concerning subject’s self-determination 
and self-esteem (Frey, 1997, ch. I). Imposing an external system of 
material incentives produces in the subjects the impression of being 
controlled and of loosing the control of the situation (Rotter, 1966), 
so that, the locus of motivation shifts from internal to external. An 
external intervention, in the same way, may bring the message that 
subject’s individual responsibility (and therefore also the potential 
merit) is not acknowledged and that her intrinsic motivation is 
rejected. “An intrinsically motivated person is denied the chance to 
display his or her own interest and involvement in an activity, when 
someone else offers a reward” (Frey, 1997, p.47). As a result of an 
underestimated responsibility, the subject experiences an impairment 
of her self-esteem, that, as a consequence, reduces her willingness to 
perform the given action. Furthermore, the way the subject perceives 
the external intervention plays a crucial role in determining the 
crowding-out or crowding-in effect. In fact, such an intervention can 
be seen either as controlling or as supporting, subjects’ behavior. In the 
latter case, we observe a strengthening of subjects’ other-regarding 
attitudes (crowding-in), in the former case, because of the impaired 
self-determination and self-esteem, we observe its weakening 
(crowding-out).  
  
 The examples described in the previous sections have usually 
been analyzed in term of the crowding-out effect. While this 
                                                 
3 See Frey (1997), for a complete review. 
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explanation accounts for the so-called hidden cost of rewards in term 
of self-esteem and supportive or controlling interventions, this 
explanatory strategy cannot account for another class of behavioral 
anomalies that relates to assumption 2) and that refers to the 
relational aspects of the agents’ motivational structure.  
 In the following section I shall discuss some examples of such 
anomalous behavior and then I will try to provide some elements for 
a unifying framework with which both classes of violations could be 
accounted for. 
5. How incentives seem to work… in practice: Inter-
personal Motivations 
The examples I have been discussing so far show how 
incentives may be ineffective in achieving their aim because of the 
coexistence of both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations is often 
neglected and incentive systems are designed “as if” only extrinsic 
ones existed. Considering different sources of personal motivation is 
just the first step towards a more descriptively accurate picture of 
economic agency. A further step should include those sources of 
motivations which are relational, that is, that arises within an 
interpersonal relationships. 
Jack Hirshleifer has argued some years ago that - “perhaps the 
grossest flaw in the economist’s traditional view of human being is 
illustrated by the attention we devote to his man-thing activities as 
opposed to man-man activities (…) Economist have been studying 
only a chapter of the book of economic life” (1978, p.336).  
Here I shall discuss examples that stress the inadequacy of such 
one-sided view of economic interaction, in particular I shall focus on 
the limitations of a consequentialist model of agency that assumes 
agents who are exclusively interested in the outcomes their actions 
lead to whose decisions are, thus, path-independent. Next I shall 
describe the role of relational incentives as trust and reciprocity.   
 
Using the so-called “gift-exchange game” (figure 1), Fehr and 
Gatcher (1997) show how, contrary to the standard economic 
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prediction, entering exchange relationships regulated by not-fully 
enforceable contracts could be efficient in terms of utility’s 
maximization. The game is framed as a labor relationship, but the 
underlying logic can be applied to a wider range of contractual 
relations. Two different treatments are considered, the 2-stage game 
and a 3-stage version of the same game. The first stage is equal in 
both games and consists of a posted offer from six principals stating 
the offered wage and the required effort. Each principals offers only 
one contract per period. All the offers are communicated to the eight 
agents in a different room.  
Agents are then required to make a choice (accept/not accept) 
among the offers to complete the first stage. In the second stage, 
agents have to determine an effort level which is associated, in a 
predetermined way, to a certain cost which is known also to the 
principals. Efforts and consequent costs, are chosen privately and 
communicated by an experimenter to the chosen principal who do 
not know agent’s identity.  
 This kind of relationship between agents and principal has been 
so designed as to reflect the typical incompleteness of the majority of 
labor contracts, involving a great deal of discretion in agents’ 
determination of their effort and a principal’s relatively small ability 
in enforcing the desired level; only the minimum level of effort is, in 
fact, efficiently enforceable. 
 After decisions about wage and effort are made, payoffs are 
calculated and assigned to players: principal’s payoff (profit) is 
positively affected by agents’ effort and negatively by the wage being 
paid and agent’s payoff (utility) are proportional to wage and 
negatively affected by the level of effort. If the offered wage is higher 
than a certain threshold value  and the effort expressed equals the 
minimum enforceable level, then the principal faces the  risk of a 
severe loss. That is why backward induction suggests that the 
principal should offer only the minimum wage and the agent should 
exert the minimum level of effort. 
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Figure 1: “The Gift Exchange Game” (Fehr and Gatcher, 1997) 
   
   Firm (F) 
   
          1st Stage 
   
       
           0<w<100 
          0.1<e<1 
   
   
    
                                      Worker (W) 
   
                   Not Accept     Accept 
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         100e – w 
              w-c(e)       Final Payoff in the 2-stage 
       Treatment 
   
   
   
        Firm (F) 
 
   
          3rd Stage 
   
         -1<p<1 
 
             100e – w – k(p) 
                   w-c(e) +25p      Final Payoff in the 3-stage 
       Treatment 
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 The 3-stage treatment is similar to the 2-stage one; the third 
additional stage, gives the principal the possibility of a (positive or 
negative) reciprocation, that is, the opportunity to reward or to 
punish the agents. Principals may choose to reward or to punish, at 
their own cost, agents’ actions by increasing of lowering agents’ final 
payoffs. 
  In both treatments the game theoretical prediction is the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium involving the lowest level of efforts 
and the lowest level of wage. The equilibrium is the same in both 
versions because punishment and rewards are considered in game 
theoretical terms, “non-credible threats” and therefore should not 
affect the strategy choices. 
 
 
Figure 2:  “Relationship between offered rent and actual effort”  
  (Fehr and Gatcher, 1997) 
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 Despite these predictions, the experimental results are 
different as far as  the desired level of efforts, the wages offered 
and the actual level of effort are concerned. The desired level of 
effort is on average 0.70 and 0.72, respectively in the 2stage and 
the 3stage game, much above the 0.1 level theoretically expected. 
These levels are constant over all the periods without any sign of 
convergence towards the equilibrium. The effort levels obtained 
are, much higher than would have been expected: an average of 
0.44 and 0.63 in respectively, the 2-stage and the 3-stage game, and 
it is positively correlated with the rent offered (figure 2). The actual 
effort is on average higher in the 3-stage game . This shows how a 
“non credible threat” can significantly affect behaviors.  
 These findings are coherent with Herbert Simon’s (1991) firm 
belief according to which “in most organizations, employees 
contribute much more to goal achievement than the minimum that 
could be extracted from them by supervisory enforcement” (p. 31-
32).  
 
A fifth example will stress the importance of having potential 
material incentives or disincentives and not using them. In their 
(2002), Fehr and List observe the behavior of a sample of Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs ) in various forms of investment games. 
In particular they considered two variants of the game, one where 
the first player is endowed with a certain amount of money and has 
to decide which part of the endowment, if any, to send to the second 
player. If she send a positive amount that is tripled and given to the 
second player who can, in turn, decide how much, if any, to send 
back. The second variant of the game is similar apart from the fact 
that a sanction can be implemented by player one, if, what she 
receives back from player two, is less that what she had expected. 
The game theoretical solution to both games is for player one to 
send nothing to player two, and for player two to send back nothing 
to player one. However, what has been observed is that not only, 
most of the experimental subjects decided to invest and to send back 
some positive amount of money, but most strikingly, such amount 
increases when the sanction are available but, actually, not used. This 
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result in interpreted by Fehr and List as a sign that: ”the availability of 
the sanctioning threat can be quite productive (…) If principals 
voluntarily refrain from using the punishment threat when it is 
available, agents exhibit significantly more trustworthiness than if the 
punishment threat is not available. Thus if agents face no 
punishment threat, the mere fact the principal could have used the 
punishment option affects the agent’s trustworthiness in a positive 
manner” (2002, p.2). Similar results are reported by Blair and Stout 
(2000) with regard to the corporate law and its enforcement in the 
American judicial practices.    
5.1.   An illustrative experiment 
 We now present the results of an experiment conducted on 
121 subjects which is  explicitly designed to explore the procedural 
versus the consequentialist attitude of players in strategic 
environments. Each player was asked to play a dictator game and a 
modified version of an investment game as described in figure 3a 
and 3b.In the dictator game player 1 has to divide and endowment 
of 30 Euros between her and Player 2. Her decision immediately 
implement the final distribution. In the “gratuitous” investment 
game, on the contrary, Player 1 has to decide whether to keep her 
endowment of 10 euros or giving it to Player 2. In the former case  
Player 2 automatically gets a payoff of 30 Euros, while in the 
second case she has to decide how to divide player 1’s endowment 
that has been tripled by the experimenter amounting now to 30 
euros. 
 What is important in this setting is that from the second 
player’s viewpoint both games being played are equivalent, with 
the only (theoretically non-significant) difference that in the 
investment game there is a bygone, that is, a branch of the game 
which is not reached. Traditional game theory produce two distinct 
prediction for these games: 
a)  we should observe a minimal offer in both games; 
b)  the offers should not differ significantly from one game to 
the other. 
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Figure 3a: Dictator-game 
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               30-y     average y » 5 
 
Figure 3b: “Gratuitous” investment-game 
 
      Player A 
     
 
  Keep   Invest 
              Player B  
         
       
                
 
         10         0  >  y  >  30  
                  30               30-y     average y » 11 
 
 
 
 However, the results show, that despite the two games are 
identical from the point of view of the consequences they lead to, 
in the investment game player 2 sends on average 11 Euros, while 
in the dictator game the average offer is of only 5 Euros (see figure 
4). 
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Figure 4. “Offers distribution” 
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 Such results are consistent with those emerged from the 
study conducted by Falk, Fehr and Fishbacher (1998). They 
compare a Reduced Ultimatum Game with a Reduced Best-Shot 
Game. In the first game the first player is asked to divide her 
endowment of 10, making an offer to her opponent. If her 
opponent accepts, then the offer is implemented and the game 
ends, otherwise, if the offer is refused both players get nothing. 
The possible offers are only two (that is why this version of the 
game is called "reduced"): either 2 or 5. In the second game, the 
Reduced Best-Shot Game we have the same structure but the 
possible offers are either 2 or 8, with consequent symmetrical 
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outcome equal to (2,8) and (8,2). Is the offer of 2 to be considered 
in the same way in both games? Experimental subjects suggest not. 
The authors find, in fact, that  the  frequency of refusal for the offer 
of 2 in the Reduced Best-Shot Game is significantly lower than that 
for the same offer in the Reduced Ultimatum Game. How are we to 
explain such a difference? Assuming that players are altruist or 
inequity averse does not help. Those theories, in fact, because of 
their forward-looking nature, cannot explain such patterns of 
behavior.  
 The alternative strategy is that of assuming that people care 
not only  about outcome but about outcomes and intentions. 
Intentions can be inferred by observing the chosen strategy not in 
isolation but within the entire strategy set; this gives to the agent the 
possibility to evaluate what the opponent could have done and did 
not. In the Reduced Ultimatum Game, in fact, the first players who 
offered 2, could have chosen an equal split but they did not. Because 
of this comparison between the actual choice and the other available 
options, such a choice is perceived as more unkind than the same 
choice in the Reduced Best-Shot Game, and punished by a higher 
rate of refusals. 
 Similar considerations about the difference between 
explanations based on distributional concerns and theories based on 
agents’ responsiveness, for instance, reciprocity models, emerge from 
the experimental results presented in Nelson (2002). 
5.2. Consequntialism, Deontologism or Relationality? 
 I am not endorsing here a deontological attitude. I believe 
that radical deontologism, implying unconditional choices would 
produce an even less satisfactory picture of human agency. What I 
am suggesting here is that players’ behaviours are neither merely 
deontological nor narrowly consequentialist, but that their 
decisions are, so-to-speak, path-dependent.  
 The evidence I have been describing suggests that people are 
much more “relational” that the classical theory implies. By 
relational I intend that players are open to others’ influences, that 
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they react to others’ first and second orders believes and 
expectations and that, when playing a game, their preferences are 
subject to a process of endogenous (trans)formation.   
 In this respect, the classical defense of consequentialism 
refers to the fact that in principle the description of a consequence 
of an action could be thought as including the action itself that 
produced the state of affairs the consequence describes. As in 
Sen’s example “A state of affairs where Brutus kills Caesar is not 
just one where Caesar has expired. Is one in which the killing of 
Caesar by Brutus figures (…) and if we decide to leave out this fact 
in the description of the state of affaires this is just a decision to be 
silent about one part of that state” (1985, pp. 181-2).  
 Such a defensive move is plausible only when it is possible 
to separate consequentialism from welfarism. It is in fact the 
welfarist component of the more general utilitaristic  perspective 
that makes the actions irrelevant to the description of the end-
states. But the fact that utilitarianism incorporates both 
consequentialism and welfarism makes it extremely difficult to 
keep distinct the two sides of the same coin. Even though we 
adopt an enlarged version of the concept of consequence, to say 
that action x is to be preferred to action y, is different from saying 
that the consequence of action x, plus action x, is better than the 
consequence of action y, plus action y. As we enlarge the concept of 
consequence such a distinction shrinks but never completely 
disappears. Otherwise consequentialism would become equivalent 
to non-consequentialism (Griffin, 1992). But consequentialism 
requires not only to evaluate actions entirely on the basis of their 
consequences but also not to consider everything else. “The result 
is a descriptive impoverishment from many perspective, including, 
among others, normative relevance” (Sen, 1980, p. 360) 
 Moreover, the contrast between descriptive adequacy and 
consequentialism has strengthened once experimental economists 
have started trying to operationalize the concept of consequence in 
real life situation attaching objective payoffs to end nodes in 
games. 
 In summarizing it can be said that the fact that bygones 
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matter means that we cannot focus our attention exclusively on the 
consequences of choices as the unique criteria that subjects use to 
evaluate their perspective actions; also the different paths or 
interactions that lead to those outcomes should become 
theoretically relevant.  
6. Relational incentives: reciprocity and trust 
 The evidence I have been presenting so far should have made 
clear how retaining assumption 1 and 2 means, somewhat, to 
reduce the descriptive and explanatory power of agency theory. 
Moreover, from the critique of assumption 2 it follows that 
opportunistic behavior is not as pervasive as assumption 3 
suggests. Actual behavior, in fact, depends on the particular 
structure of the interaction players are placed in and on the 
behavior of all the relevant players. The data seems to suggest that 
a more satisfactory version of agency theory should incorporate a 
behavioral explanation of how incentives works and a more 
realistic model of economic agent. In this section I shall discuss 
two of the principles that may help in building such a theory, 
namely, reciprocity and trust.  
 The bargaining experiments I have been discussing highlight 
that real people tend to behave kindly to those who have been kind 
to them and unkindly with who has been unkind. Those behaviors 
respond to the norm of (positive and negative) reciprocity. It has 
been shown both empirically and theoretically (Rabin, 1993) how, in 
certain conditions, such a norm may offset the effect of the material 
payoffs in the strategic decision making. The effect of reciprocity 
may lead the subject to act in a way that appears to be contrary to her 
material self-interest. The idea of reciprocity is ultimately based on 
the joint effects of material and psychological incentives. That means 
that the motivation that triggers (positive or negative) reciprocal 
behavior is ultimately based on material incentives. The perceived 
kindness that elicits reciprocal behavior, is a measure of material 
benefit that an agent's choice attributes to another player.  
Following this logic, Rabin, in his model, formalizes the idea 
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in a way that player A feels motivated to reciprocate when, from 
player B’s expected action, she can get a material payoff higher that 
the equitable one (which constitutes a measure of fair distribution). 
Such an increase refers to material payoffs. Acting in a way which 
repays (ignores) such an expected material gain, leads to A a 
psychological gain (loss).  
Some of the other experiments I have reported, however, 
show that yet another behavioral principle may be at work in similar 
situations, namely, trust, in particular, in the form of trust 
responsiveness (Bacharach, Guerra, Zizzo, 2002; Pelligra, 2002a, 
2002b, 2004).  The main feature of trust in this particular meaning, 
refers to the fact that an explicit act of trust has the peculiarity of 
“inducing” or “eliciting”, to some degree, a trustworthy response. 
In this respect is said that trust is responsive or self-fulfilling. 
Suppose we have two agents, A and B: according to the 
“responsive trust” conception, B’s trustworthiness may be induced 
by A’s choosing a trustful course of action (like, for instance, 
player 1 sending money to player 2 in the gratuitous investment 
game, or offering an above-the-minimum wage in the gift 
exchange game). This kind of inducement assumes the existence of 
a psychological mechanism according to which, A’s trustful action, 
motivates B to reward such trustfulness, making him behave 
trustworthily, even though such a behavior implies some material 
cost. I call such a psychological mechanism “trust responsiveness”.  
While reciprocity, as I have said, is based on the joint action of 
both material and psychological incentives, trust responsiveness, is 
exclusively based on a psychological-moral motivation. It is the 
(trustful) action that motivates the trustee, and not the potential 
beneficial consequences for her material wealth that she may derive 
from it. By trusting me, you manifest to me your expectations on my 
behavior. If I consciously fulfill (frustrate) it, I get an increase 
(decrease) in my psychological payoff. Put it in another way, while 
reciprocity in Rabin’s theory is the act of conferring benefits on 
people who have previously materially benefited you, trust 
responsiveness is the act of conferring benefits on people who have 
shown that they expect you to do so, and have willingly exposed 
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themselves to harm in the event that you act on material self-interest.  
Such a difference becomes clear when one considers a 
certain class of situations where reciprocity- and trust 
responsiveness-based behaviors are not observationally equivalent, 
but leads to divergent predictions.  
Consider the logic of reciprocity applied to the particular 
Trust Game of figure 5a below. We know that reciprocity takes the 
form of returning kindness for kindness and unkindness for 
unkindness. In this game that means that, if A expects B to play R 
then “A playing R” is perceived as kind by B who in turn feels 
motivated to play R.  Consider now the instance of the Trust 
Game depicted in figure 5b.  
 What result would the logic of reciprocity produce in this 
particular game? Since now, if A expects B to play R, “A playing 
R” does not provide any benefit to B, if B expects A to play R, 
therefore the logic of reciprocity would suggest B to play L, 
straight away. What about trust responsiveness? If, on the 
contrary, we consider a trust responsive B player, we would 
observe him playing R in both situations, despite the difference in 
the material benefits he would obtain from A's move. 
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Figure 5a.   
The Trust Game 
 
   Player A 
 
 L           R 
      
   Player B 
 
        L    R   
            
5 0        10 
5 15      10 
 
Figure 5b.   
The Gratuitous Trust Game  
 
   Player A 
 
 L           R 
      
   Player B 
 
        L    R   
            
         5  0       10 
        10    15   10
I have labeled the latter particular form of the trust game as the 
"Gratuitous Trust Game" expressly to emphasize that in this game 
any instance of co-operative behavior, cannot be thought as an 
exchange, though delayed, of material benefits.  
 These examples shed light on the difference between trust 
responsiveness and reciprocity on the issue of material/non 
material incentives to action. In the Gratuitous Trust Game, in fact, 
a B player would get the same material payoff, both from A’s 
trustful choice (followed by B’s trustworthy one) and from A’s 
distrustful choice (L). Differently from the simple trust game, the 
only way for B to get a payoff higher than 10, in the Gratuitous 
Trust Game, is to behave opportunistically. That means that if one 
observes a B player playing R in the gratuitous version of the trust 
game, that behavior cannot be explained in terms of reciprocity, 
while it still remains consistent with an explanation based on the 
trust responsiveness hypothesis. The empirical relevance of such 
trust-responsive pattern of behavior is documented in Bacharach, 
Guerra, Zizzo, (2002) and Pelligra (2002a).  
 
 It should have become clear, by now, how the logic of 
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trust responsiveness may subsume the crowding-out effect. A 
material reward, a payment to do something that the agent was 
willing to do on the basis of intrinsic motivations, convey a sense 
of distrust that elicits opportunism.  
 As we know from the functioning of trust responsiveness, 
agents have a tendency to conform to others’ manifest 
expectations. In the case of crowding-out effects, a conflict arises 
between internal and external reasons for agents’ action. Consider a 
worker that performs poorly when monitored. She will disappoint 
her principal but, at the same time, she will react, on the basis of her 
sense of worth and self-esteem, to an act of hostility by her 
employer (a distrustful monitoring). While crowding motivation 
theory explains different behaviors assuming the existence of two 
different types of motives for action (intrinsic and extrinsic), trust 
responsiveness suggests that the different effects of (dis)incentives 
depends on the relative weight of the social and psychological 
consequences. Following Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, we can 
isolate three main sources of motivations: material, social and 
internal. Material motivations are related to the material outcomes 
of our actions; social motivations refers to the degree of social 
approval and praise that derives from the others’ observing our 
actions. The third source of motivation, the internal, refers to the 
extent to which we think our own actions really deserve such a 
praise or blame. We want, in fact, not only to want to be praise but 
also to be praiseworthy”. In Smith’s own words: 
 
 Man naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to be lovely; or to 
be that thing which is the natural and proper object of love. He naturally dreads, 
not only to be hated, but to be hateful; or to be that thing which is the natural 
and proper object of hatred. He desires, not only praise, but praiseworthiness; or 
to be that thing which, though it should be praised by nobody, is, however, the 
natural and proper object of praise. He dreads, not only blame, but blame 
worthiness; or to be that thing which, though it should be blamed by nobody, is, 
however, the natural and proper object of blame.  (Smith, 1759/1976, 
sec.III.2.1) 
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7. Implications for policy and institutional design 
 
 While the motivational crowding-out, although not 
standard in agency theory can easily be incorporated in a classical 
rational choice model (Frey, Oberholzer-Gee, 1997), reciprocity 
and trust, on the other hand, imply that players are responsive to 
other players’ behavior, that is, that payoffs are endogenous. Such 
a characteristic makes impossible to reconcile those principles 
with the standard model of game theory which is essentially 
consequentialist (Geneakoplos, Pearce,  Stacchetti, 1989; Rabin, 
1993).  
 Apart from their theoretical implications, the behavioral 
regularities I have been describing, have also important normative 
implications, in particular as far as the design of optimal 
incentives schemes is concerned. If people, in fact, draw 
psychological utility from self-esteem, social approval, reciprocal 
behavior and trustworthiness, those elements should be 
incorporated in the incentive systems and managed as important 
organizational  resources. To avoid crowding-out effects, material 
rewards have to be carefully engineered to convey a sense of 
support instead of a sense of control that may backfire reducing 
subjects’ own intrinsic motivation to perform the same action the 
incentives were supposed to favor.  
 Moreover, being reciprocity and trust motivational 
active elements, interaction schemes should be created within the 
organizations capable to activate those elements. A too strict 
monitoring, for instance, reducing the room for socially approved 
intrinsic trustworthiness, risks to signal a sense of mistrust that 
may increase opportunism and shirking, instead of reducing it, as 
Barkema’s experiment clearly shows. To lay down even the most 
specific details of a contract may subtract space for reciprocal 
actions and may, as we saw in the gift-exchange game, to pareto-
inferior outcomes.  
 Reciprocity and trust are norms enforced by 
interpersonal social pressure and, as Fehr and Falk (2002) have 
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recently noticed, such norms are likely to produce strategic 
complementarity among agents’ actions. That means that the 
efficacy of the social approval motive depends on others’ people 
behavior. If others are sensitive to approval and disapproval from 
their peers, each agent’s action will find in the desire for others’ 
praise, a strong psychological incentive, otherwise, the material 
reward will always be predominant. That opens the possibility for 
Pareto-rankable multiple equilibria to emerge. The transition 
from an inefficient equilibrium to a more efficient one would 
depend, then, on how social incentives work within the 
organization. An “atmosphere” can be then created where the 
desire for others’ praise may be encouraged and that may, 
ultimately favors agents’ praiseworthiness or at least agents’ desire 
for social praise.        
 As Matthew Rabin clearly put it: “Economics should be 
concerned not only with the efficient allocation of material 
goods, but also with designing institutions such that people are 
happy about the way they interact with others” (1993, p. 1283). 
Precisely in this sense, agents’ internal, intrinsic motivations 
should be considered as economic realities, as well as their desire 
for material reward. A careful design is needed to avoid the risk 
of stimulating a clash between the two kinds of motivations.  
 Intrinsic motivations, trust and reciprocity may be 
thought of as important, sometime, crucial assets of each 
organization. Neglecting this point  would produce 
counterproductive effects with consequent waste of resources 
and harm for the organization’s efficiency. 
8. Conclusions 
In this paper I have critically discussed and challenged the 
three main assumptions of agency theory, respectively, that the 
higher the wage the higher the effort exerted, that people are 
interested only in the outcomes their actions lead to and that, 
given the asymmetry in the information structure, whenever 
possible, the agent will behave opportunistically. According to 
this standard view the agent are to be considered “self-interest-
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seeker with guile”, to use Williamson’s expression (1985). 
My alternative position maintains that: 
1) because of the interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic 
motives, may well be possible that the use of material rewards to 
incentive intrinsically motivated activities, turns out to reduce the 
performance of such activities (motivational crowding-out);  
2) people are responsive to others’ behavior, therefore the 
same outcome may be differently evaluated depending on the 
strategies that lead to it; 
3) for this reason people tend to behave opportunistically 
much less than the classical theory would suggest.  Trust and 
reciprocity are principles that account for the observed 
anomalous behaviors. 
 
Those points have important implications for the activity of 
institutional design. The desire for social approval, trust and 
reciprocity, have to be considered as organizational resources that 
should be carefully engineered to avoid counterproductive effects 
and to improve the overall performance. 
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